Читаю в стэнфордовской энциклопедии статью про индуктивную логику, набираюсь ума.

И нахожу там следующий абзац:

It is now generally held that the core idea of Bayesian logicism is fatally flawed—that syntactic logical structure cannot be the sole determiner of the degree to which premises inductively support conclusions. A crucial facet of the problem faced by Bayesian logicism involves how the logic is supposed to apply to scientific contexts where the conclusion sentence is some hypothesis or theory, and the premises are evidence claims. The difficulty is that in any probabilistic logic that satisfies the usual axioms for probabilities, the inductive support for a hypothesis must depend in part on its prior probability. This prior probability represents how plausible the hypothesis is supposed to be on its own, before the evidence is brought to bear. A Bayesian logicist must tell us how to assign values to these pre-evidential prior plausibilities for each hypothesis or theory under consideration, and must do so in a way that relies only on their syntactic logical structure, or on some measure of their syntactic simplicity. There are severe technical problems with getting this idea to work. Moreover, various counter-examples seem to show that such an approach must assign intuitively quite unreasonable prior probabilities to many hypotheses.

думаю – что-то мне это напоминает…

АААА!!! ВОТ!!!!

http://www.dilbert.com/comics/dilbert/archive/dilbert-20061231.html

PS
Не понимающим английского: увы и ах вам. Лениво переводить.